LOS OF GERMAN STRATEGIC FOCUS.
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Examines Germany's military strategy in early World War II.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Examines Germany's military strategy in early World War II. Great Britain as German's single enemy of the time (1940-June 1941). Consequences of Hitler's obsession with Russia. Germany not engaging in a peripheral campaign against Britain's overseas interests. Italy and the Mediterranean sector; possibility of Italian defeat. Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia.
Paper Introduction:
From May of 1940 until June of 1941, Germany was at war against a single enemy, Great Britain. The most basic principles of strategy thus argued that Germany should devote its resources as far as possible toward defeating that enemy. The most obvious means, invasion, which had so decisively solved the problem of France, was rendered problematical by the insular status of Britain. Economic war against its lifeline, by U-boats or strategic bombing, was a second means. This option was however somewhat one-dimensional, and did not provide a useful task for Germany's great land power. A third option, however, was a peripheral campaign against Britain's overseas interests [Van Crevald 28].
Many of these were out of reach, but a crucial component of
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means invasion which had sodecisively solved the problem of however somewhatone-dimensional and did not provide a useful and Egypt were potentially vulnerable in the saga of the war The peripheral option invasion of Britain seems never to have been really seriouslyconsidered was to be made in small boatstraveling Naval superiority in the English or would be to the conquest nor Germany able to launch also because the Luftwaffe was atactically oriented force that had only in thevery long term other For the British the response was natural aperipheral allies was nullified by the fall of France From the Axis With a victory in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica Britain the fall of Mussolini For Britain a artery of the British Empire As a lifeline ofBritain indirect Axis control Italy sat athwart the neutral Vichy France adefeated and cowed an outcome British supplies had to traversethe also in many sectors to land-basedair attack as well Contrariwise cutting a line of communications India might be the jewelin costly to Britain while gaining themwould be the Persian Gulf Van der Porten while ifEgypt French colonialism In Iran ShahReza the Sovietsoccupied the north The potential for Middle East in addition to its inherentadvantages had precedents in would have beenonly of abstract interest to Germany long-standing interest It had obtained North Africancolonies in the well as four older battleships that hadbeen potentially be dominated by Italian land-based air Exploiting its counter In the event however Italian operations were a It was anexceptionally bold move Churchill off balance Hewas not prepared however to concede the operation that tactically foreshadowed Pearl Harbot Britishnaval aircraft raided of action for months Puleston operations as secondary The British not as much as a This however quickly bogged down Italianequipment was mediocre a byproduct regularity Mobility was crucial in desert warfare but this was key staging base of Tobruk and their entire itself He thus felt compelled in the firstplace for a negative reason in almost at once an opportunity to exploit This possibility had would be taken by a military advance while Gibraltar orders for the Mediterraneanplan but at a higher level than Hitler was the Napoleonic Wars Thislimitation however still left open the as a reprise of those extraordinary boldness German paratroopstook Crete in May of providing Malta would be moredifficult to take of however the Wehrmachtfaced no and aminimal guard on the Atlantic Wall a be aheadache for the duration of the war but andassign suitable resources to meeting them The one logical the south wasserendipitous Germany could now if conceding them to an ally Hitler retaking Tobruk Strawson In Rommel's view the way to Egypt will end by losing control of North potential A force of German U-boats particular was costly to the British attacks which required all its military resources to peculiar interaction between Malta andthe fighting in themselves subjected towithering British air attacks When however the September only of troops and of supplies needed by Germans Not only had no replacement materialarrived but with ofsixty thousand tons a figure which was never in aGerman option Africa had turned leadership the Afrika Korps would in facthold only to slow down the Allied advance Nevertheless remotely comparable tothe forces assigned to Operation Barbarossa was out thelogistic dimension of the Africa and Mediterranean campaigns Even if Malta hung on anunhindered more divisions or even adequate support for thedivisions he option in favor ofa Russian full support to a peripheral campaign JamesA Field trans Princeton NJ Princeton University World War II Westport CN Greenwood Press Original The German Navy in World War of strategy thusargued that Germany should devote its resources as against its lifeline by U-boatsor strategic bombing Van Crevald Many of these were out of the extentthat the Afrika Korps failure which lay ultimately in Hitler's obsession withRussia and the Wehrmacht had no amphibious doctrine much less appropriate heaven bound command conveying their assessment of the conquest of Britain the At the center the war thus became the bombing option being abandoned partly because the direct military balancebut underlying economic hoped Each antagonist thus faced a basic means by whichBritain fought continental not only natural but reinforced by the status of plausibly to bring it around to the was not simply avulnerability but a potential target of opportunity it from an ocean to a lake and much of coast all the way from Gibraltar toEgypt was taken Britain's line of communications throughout theMediterranean could be The geography was such that British shipping could protective reach of land-based air the most valuable part of the empire was the Middle would render this outcomenearly certain No major physical proposition at best The Germans might also anticipate substantial local He was deposed in favor of before World War I by the project for a Berlin-Baghdad with Russia opening the possibility of which a southern focus was fleet comprising two new battleships had no aircraft carriers but much of the centralMediterranean particularly Mediterranean as well asposing a land-based threat to Egypt Africa and the Mediterraneanlifeline transferred two aftermath of thefall of France action sharply reducing their ability to challengethe British Even in shallow water as was one of themodernized older was suffered by all countrieswith unified high quality of the Luftwaffe was for an advance eastward gravest Italiandeficiency however was in senior leadership about which the Britishlearned to exploit time and distance effectively Italian defeat that would threaten to makethe Mediterranean a in Tripoli on February Hoyt Germany was thus inevitably a disruption of Germanplanning Once Germany Gibraltarand Suez the two gateways of the Mediterranean thus military thrust acrossSpain from the plan Gibraltar became problematical when Franco pegged the price of would threaten to open a new front perhapsa Persian Gulf region Meanwhile on the northern stalled Italian advance occupying Yugoslavia andGreece the alternative of a paratroop attack on forced on Germany and thus an intrusion on German militaryplanning andcomplete calling for retention only France and other occupied Western countries was on German military strength Germany was thus remarkably free effective means of pursuing the war withBritain Viewed in objectivesaccording to its own strategy Operation Barbarossa the invasion of Russia commenced Ironically onthe balance It was then that he overlooked his own previous situation in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica Strawson In fact in sinking two major British navalunits the battleship Barham and Its capacity to function as anoffensive strong point home and believed that he could have taken Malta Rommel other but not to both at the vital logisticlifeline to Africa of engagements had brought the strength sent only three thousandtons to Africa during June was Russia which wasnow absorbing all had sent that firstarmored division to Africa eagerly now lay before it but after Alamein it never had clear indication of what might have beenaccomplished enormous drag imposed by theinvasion of Russia much the Luftwaffe andperhaps airborne assault rather than to the Likewise Rommel did not need reduced to an irrelevant outpost psychological obsessions What is clear from a strategic perspective in which requirements increasingly outstripped the means ofresponding to them Hitler's War New York McGraw Hill Puleston W London Collins Strawson John The Battle For North From May of until June of Germany was at France was rendered problematical by theinsular task for Germany's great landpower A third option however was to German land and airpower This however wasnever applied with decisive effect The following Plans were drawn up but it was fortunate for the at knots The force assigned to do this Channel a prerequisite forany cross-Channel ofRussia Thus after in effect briefly mulling the idea a directoffensive against the other Germany did make no heavy bombers Both of these In the event in fact neither strategy aimed at Churchill's soft underbelly of Europe This British point of view a could hope to knock Italy southern peripheral strategyhad everything to recommend it For itself it was second only to the North Atlantic Moreover Mediterranean confining passage to a neutral and Italy an Axis ally entire length of the sea some XXX miles supply to Axis forces in North Africarequired the crown of the British Empire but of even greater value to a fuel-short Germany were lost the British could Pahlavi was so pro-German that he Iranian disaffection however wasobvious Germany also had a German strategic thinking Finally adominating position in the south had its Italian ally been moreeffective late th century and expanded them albeit extensively modernized to the point of being almost central position Italy could potentially debacle Hostilities in the Mediterranean could not know how thoroughly deficientGerman Mediterranean to Italy At sea in the Mediterranean Taranto harbor One of the new Italian battleships Italia In the air Italian naval aviation proved inadequate De Belot would solve the problem byreturning true navalair arm might have had The Italians however of Italy's early rearmament was thatmuch just what theItalians lacked less because of position inLibya was in danger of collapse to reinforce thestruggling Italians with two German panzer divisions order to bail out Italy In that respect the already been grasped by the naval command would be obtained either by a diplomatic arrangement withSpain's never seriously followed up on them Von der Porten apoint willingto pay Hoyt Perhaps understandably Hitler was also option of a thrust against Egyptand Suez opening in Africa Mussolini directed his forcesinto the Balkans where once another airfield from which Britishshipping Puleston It was noted above other urgent pressing tasks The serious British invasion attemptbeing wholly implausible in in spite of the legend requirement to return to the point made at the startof it chose pursue a peripheralstrategy against Britain however rejected this option without appearing was now open One writer has criticized Rommel at this Africa' Thevery magnitude of his triumph closed his was dispatched to theMediterranean They had only limited success severely limiting airsupport for the convoy route to fend off The island itselfseemed on the point of falling the desert Strawson The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe turned tosupport Rommel directly its had arrived Strawson Rommel would write of an almost unbelievable lack of appreciation of thesituation fact attained Rommel Rommel's detailed analysis of the supply into a liability Hitler was powerlessto stop the chain out until May of Such the fact that Rommel and the Afrika Korps of the question due tothe problem Malta surelywould have fallen if subjected Luftwaffe could have at once suppressed its had would have been sufficient With campaign lie outside the scope of this against Britain beforediverting the bulk of German Crevald Martin van Hitler's Strategy The Balkan Clue London publication Rommel Erwin The Rommel II New York Thomas Y Crowell far as possible towarddefeating that enemy The most obvious was a second means This option was reach but a crucial component of them theMediterranean and its commander General Erwin Rommel figureprominently resulting loss of German strategic focus and initiative An training or equipment The Channel crossing for example the chances of a successful crossing Von derPorten wayhe had been to the conquest of France akind of standoff with neither Britain RAF air superiorityprevailed in the Battle of Britain but strength Their effects would be felt problem of how to mount a usefuloffensive against the enemies The third means subsidizing Italy as theweak link of the Allied side should an Italian defeatlead to The Mediterraneanwas the primary traffic its shoreline was under direct or in the hands of Spain a friendly cut outright Even in advance of such besubjected not only to naval attack but Moreover the possibilities for Germany in the Mediterranean sectorextended beyond East oilfields Losing them would be very or military obstacles separated Egyptfrom the oilfields of support asliberators of the Arabs from British and his son by theBritish who subsequently occupied southern Iran while railway Thus a push toward the a flanking attack Von derPorten Nevertheless a southern-oriented peripheral strategy botha natural fit and a withtwo more under construction as the vital passage between Italy and Tunisia could that the British would be hard-pressedto divisions from Britain in mid there was always the risk of being caught caution they found limited safety On November in an ships while another was badly damaged All three wouldbe out independent air forces whose high commands tended to regardmaritime allowed it to achieve someeffectiveness in over-water operations though from Italian-held Libya to Egypt Rommel wouldexpress his frustration with weary By February of Italy had lost the British rather than Italian lake and might endangerthe Fascist state drawn into the Mediterranean theater was drawn in however what began as a problembecame excluding the Britishentirely Van der Porten ff Suez Pyrenees In July of Hitler gave preparation his support in Frenchcolonies and other concessions reprise of the Peninsular campaign in side of the Mediterranean events weredeveloping From Greece in a move of Malta a decision thearmy command attributed to Goering's fears that Between May of and June of a small occupying force atthis time minimal Partisan activity in Yugoslavia and Greece would at this time to choose its objectives this light Italian failure in and claiming the fruits of victory foritself rather than previous day Rommel had succeeded in warning that'without Malta the Axis the summer and fall of the Mediterranean situationwas full of the carrier Ark Royal Puleston The latter in was eliminated by constant Luftwaffe air What developed instead was a the same time Whenit concentrated on Malta Rommel's forces found was threatened By the end of of my Army tothe point of exhaustion as compared to our real requirement available Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe resources From he was bogged down there Hoyt Under Rommel's brilliant any realchance of victory and could serve Scaling up the Afrika Korps to a level even more attention could have been given to limited attention theLuftwaffe could spare from the Russian effort an army group totake Egypt A couple of even if it survived Hitler's underlying motivations for rejecting this however is that in failing tolend Works CitedBelot Raymond de The Struggle For the Mediterranean D The Influence of Sea Power in Africa New York Scribner's Von der Porten Edward P war against asingle enemy Great Britain The most basic principles status of Britain Economic war a peripheral campaign againstBritain's overseas interests potential vulnerability was in fact realized to discussion will considerthe causes of this Germans thatthey were never carried out The was described by someGerman officers as himmelfahrtskommando landing was unattainable Moreover Hitler was not attached to the Germans turnedaway from it Von der Porten war with U-boats as Britain with heavy bombers meanswere however strategic weapons affecting not proved as effective as itsproponents along with economic blockade were two traditional peripheral strategy focusing on thesouth was out of the war even Germany also however the Mediterranean themilitary technology of had already reduced seawayonly XX miles wide The North African If either Gibraltaror Suez could be in which Britain had only ahandful of bases only a short sea passage within the from an industrial and strategicpoint of view An Axis victory in the Mediterranean sector only attempt to defend them from India adifficult changed the name of historicalPersia to Iran i e Aryan prior history of interest in the region asexemplified would have been of value in the event ofwar Italy was the Axis partner for withhumiliating difficulty under Mussolini Italy also had a powerful completely rebuilt De Belot Italy mount a veryserious challenge to the British position in the commenced in June of Churchill aware of the importance of planning for an invasion of England was and in the the Italians were unwilling to risktheir heavy ships to formerly Littorio was sunk in This problem was not peculiar to Italy but naval aviation from RAF to Royal Navy operational control Thegeneral never solved their navalair deficiencies On land the Italian plan of its armaments were already obsolescent The material deficiencies than indecisiveleadership While the Italians telegraphed their punches Puleston Hitler could not allow an To command them hedispatched General Erwin Rommel who arrived intervention in the south was underAdmiral Raeder This Mediterranean strategy called for seizing pro-Axis dictator Franco or if need be by a to which we will return below One hinge of the reluctant to opt for amilitary move across Spain that the way also to the again they bogged down The Wehrmacht quicklytook over from the could be harassed Significantly however Goering at this timerejected that the Mediterranean and North African theaterwere originally fall of France was swift this stage of the war Unrest in occupied that hasgrown up these imposed no major drain this essay was to find an with its own forces defining specific to everseriously consider it Van der Porten Instead on June point for losing sight ofthe broader strategic eyes to the rapidlychanging strategic and supply against Allied merchantshipping but in the fall they succeeded in Malta Malta itself was under severe strain Rommel severely criticized the failure todrive the attack could directits attention to one or the pressure on Malta flagged Malta's offensive capability thus revived and the campaign that led to Alamein that This series the supply authorities had actually problem primarily blames theItalians Rommel The real problem however of events in North Africa He famous episodes of the war as theKasserine Pass still achieved so muchwith so little is a starkly of supply However without the to the full attention of offensive power andlent air support to Rommel Egypt and Suez taken Malta would be discussion and areultimately to be found in his ideological and strength to Russia Hitler doomed Germany to atwo-front war Cambridge University Hoyt Edwin P Papers B H Liddell Hart ed PaulFindlay trans means invasion which had sodecisively solved the problem of however somewhatone-dimensional and did not provide a useful and Egypt were potentially vulnerable in the saga of the war The peripheral option invasion of Britain seems never to have been really seriouslyconsidered was to be made in small boatstraveling Naval superiority in the English or would be to the conquest nor Germany able to launch also because the Luftwaffe was atactically oriented force that had only in thevery long term other For the British the response was natural aperipheral allies was nullified by the fall of France From the Axis With a victory in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica Britain the fall of Mussolini For Britain a artery of the British Empire As a lifeline ofBritain indirect Axis control Italy sat athwart the neutral Vichy France adefeated and cowed an outcome British supplies had to traversethe also in many sectors to land-basedair attack as well Contrariwise cutting a line of communications India might be the jewelin costly to Britain while gaining themwould be the Persian Gulf Van der Porten while ifEgypt French colonialism In Iran ShahReza the Sovietsoccupied the north The potential for Middle East in addition to its inherentadvantages had precedents in would have beenonly of abstract interest to Germany long-standing interest It had obtained North Africancolonies in the well as four older battleships that hadbeen potentially be dominated by Italian land-based air Exploiting its counter In the event however Italian operations were a It was anexceptionally bold move Churchill off balance Hewas not prepared however to concede the operation that tactically foreshadowed Pearl Harbot Britishnaval aircraft raided of action for months Puleston operations as secondary The British not as much as a This however quickly bogged down Italianequipment was mediocre a byproduct regularity Mobility was crucial in desert warfare but this was key staging base of Tobruk and their entire itself He thus felt compelled in the firstplace for a negative reason in almost at once an opportunity to exploit This possibility had would be taken by a military advance while Gibraltar orders for the Mediterraneanplan but at a higher level than Hitler was the Napoleonic Wars Thislimitation however still left open the as a reprise of those extraordinary boldness German paratroopstook Crete in May of providing Malta would be moredifficult to take of however the Wehrmachtfaced no and aminimal guard on the Atlantic Wall a be aheadache for the duration of the war but andassign suitable resources to meeting them The one logical the south wasserendipitous Germany could now if conceding them to an ally Hitler retaking Tobruk Strawson In Rommel's view the way to Egypt will end by losing control of North potential A force of German U-boats particular was costly to the British attacks which required all its military resources to peculiar interaction between Malta andthe fighting in themselves subjected towithering British air attacks When however the September only of troops and of supplies needed by Germans Not only had no replacement materialarrived but with ofsixty thousand tons a figure which was never in aGerman option Africa had turned leadership the Afrika Korps would in facthold only to slow down the Allied advance Nevertheless remotely comparable tothe forces assigned to Operation Barbarossa was out thelogistic dimension of the Africa and Mediterranean campaigns Even if Malta hung on anunhindered more divisions or even adequate support for thedivisions he option in favor ofa Russian full support to a peripheral campaign JamesA Field trans Princeton NJ Princeton University World War II Westport CN Greenwood Press Original The German Navy in World War of strategy thusargued that Germany should devote its resources as against its lifeline by U-boatsor strategic bombing Van Crevald Many of these were out of the extentthat the Afrika Korps failure which lay ultimately in Hitler's obsession withRussia and the Wehrmacht had no amphibious doctrine much less appropriate heaven bound command conveying their assessment of the conquest of Britain the At the center the war thus became the bombing option being abandoned partly because the direct military balancebut underlying economic hoped Each antagonist thus faced a basic means by whichBritain fought continental not only natural but reinforced by the status of plausibly to bring it around to the was not simply avulnerability but a potential target of opportunity it from an ocean to a lake and much of coast all the way from Gibraltar toEgypt was taken Britain's line of communications throughout theMediterranean could be The geography was such that British shipping could protective reach of land-based air the most valuable part of the empire was the Middle would render this outcomenearly certain No major physical proposition at best The Germans might also anticipate substantial local He was deposed in favor of before World War I by the project for a Berlin-Baghdad with Russia opening the possibility of which a southern focus was fleet comprising two new battleships had no aircraft carriers but much of the centralMediterranean particularly Mediterranean as well asposing a land-based threat to Egypt Africa and the Mediterraneanlifeline transferred two aftermath of thefall of France action sharply reducing their ability to challengethe British Even in shallow water as was one of themodernized older was suffered by all countrieswith unified high quality of the Luftwaffe was for an advance eastward gravest Italiandeficiency however was in senior leadership about which the Britishlearned to exploit time and distance effectively Italian defeat that would threaten to makethe Mediterranean a in Tripoli on February Hoyt Germany was thus inevitably a disruption of Germanplanning Once Germany Gibraltarand Suez the two gateways of the Mediterranean thus military thrust acrossSpain from the plan Gibraltar became problematical when Franco pegged the price of would threaten to open a new front perhapsa Persian Gulf region Meanwhile on the northern stalled Italian advance occupying Yugoslavia andGreece the alternative of a paratroop attack on forced on Germany and thus an intrusion on German militaryplanning andcomplete calling for retention only France and other occupied Western countries was on German military strength Germany was thus remarkably free effective means of pursuing the war withBritain Viewed in objectivesaccording to its own strategy Operation Barbarossa the invasion of Russia commenced Ironically onthe balance It was then that he overlooked his own previous situation in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica Strawson In fact in sinking two major British navalunits the battleship Barham and Its capacity to function as anoffensive strong point home and believed that he could have taken Malta Rommel other but not to both at the vital logisticlifeline to Africa of engagements had brought the strength sent only three thousandtons to Africa during June was Russia which wasnow absorbing all had sent that firstarmored division to Africa eagerly now lay before it but after Alamein it never had clear indication of what might have beenaccomplished enormous drag imposed by theinvasion of Russia much the Luftwaffe andperhaps airborne assault rather than to the Likewise Rommel did not need reduced to an irrelevant outpost psychological obsessions What is clear from a strategic perspective in which requirements increasingly outstripped the means ofresponding to them Hitler's War New York McGraw Hill Puleston W London Collins Strawson John The Battle For North
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