YUGOSLAV CONFLICT.
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Essay Subject:
Analyzes history & evolution of ethnic/nationalist struggle through 1995, focusing on role of U.N. & international powers in resolution of conflict through military, diplomatic & humanitarian means.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analyzes history & evolution of ethnic/nationalist struggle through 1995, focusing on role of U.N. & international powers in resolution of conflict through military, diplomatic & humanitarian means.
Paper Introduction:
Introduction
This paper presents a case study on conflict management, specifically the experience of the United Nations and other International Government Organizations (IGOs) in the Yugoslav conflict. The purpose of this case study is to describe, analyze and assess a particular conflict situation with a focus on the role played by the United Nations and other IGOs in attempts to manage the conflict and addresses the following specific questions: What is the issue at stake, who are the primary and secondary participants in the conflict, and how are the U.N. and other IGOs involved?
This paper is divided in several parts. The first part provides a historical background on Yugoslavia, prior to the outbreak of the conflict in the past decade. The second part
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to describe analyze and assess a particular conflict situationwith the primary and secondaryparticipants in the conflict Yugoslavia prior to the outbreak of the conflictin the partreviews the chronological participation of the European Community EC theUnited the fifth part providesconclusions about the methods has been one of conflict In the firstcentury A D Illyria Romana This cultural divisionstill existed when the land Because it was acombination of Serbians Croats and Bulgarians and started to ended in total Serbian defeat and their becoming vassals ofthe to keep the Turks out of Europe formally came into being The Serbsaccepted the creation of the state andimmediately wanted concessions As always the Bosnian Muslims Tito fought against the Germans while Union and takingYugoslavia his own scope of his influence for he cannot be separated from the examination of foreignpolicy changes republics The six separate republics of Yugoslavia Montenegro Macedonia Serbia emerge Withprescience he was concerned If we go on like Yugoslav Conflict After Tito's death internal contributions to the upkeep of was halted and some limited centralization wasreintroduced Three things kept fears of the Western world was that would engulf Europe Only one unifying force idea since they lookedforward to democratization secessionist-minded of the various republics wasSlovenia Slovenia In amendments were made to the the election Meanwhile Croatia was as a buffer between thegroups The government ordered the in Yugoslavia degenerated into total civil war theworld off all aid to Yugoslavia A at a peaceful solution However the or starting a war A ceasefire in Sloveniaheld but country The warring partiesagreed to an EC peace plan that sanctions against Yugoslavia The package did billion reimposed textile quotas endedpreferential trade treatment and constitutional settlement in Yugoslavia Thesesanctions effectively ended the EC's job for human rights andsafety for ethnic separate states of Croatia and citizensto exchange their money before the New Year The parliament reconfirmed Germany as the dominant economicand political power in Chancellor HelmutKohl was under pressure from his opposition to the U N Security Council in Slovenia losing large areas of Croatia Serbiadecided to turn separation theBosnians were determined not had held secret talks about dividing move seriously toward independence On October Bosnia declared President Izetbegovic of Bosnia issued Croats were unhappy with becomingminorities in He realized that if he could blitz in which the Muslims were shown at large is generally poor This is seeking to justify theirpolicy of inaction conflictequally guilty to attribute the ancient and irrational animosities While a great deal of hatred fall out and come to blows The perennial enemies Serbs from Serbia and Croatsfrom Yet from the moment that Milosevic the s and a convenient tool which of Croat and Muslimoppression However the timeto resolve it Moreover given which was verygenerous to the Serb position The country was prepared to commit territories even though such entities inCroatia they could not go into Bosnia-Herzegovina However into Sarajevo to takecontrol of the airport and allow in June duringSecretary of State doubt told Serbia and the Yugoslav army Cyrus Vance's peaceplan of January which offered U in March Bosnia askedfor U during President Mitterand'svisit to Sarajevo Human relief efforts were being recognized Inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia were of theindependence of Slovenia and Croatia Bosnian Croats place The result was ahumanitarian groundinvolved fewer changes in territorial control after late political intervention andpolitical intervention by the strong in the affairs That is intervention depends both on what nation building but individual states and in long beenagainst intervention in another's own borders withoutinterference from others Mandelbaum the United States is not based on gold U S military into thesefour distant parts of EC took the lead But to cope withit since they members on how or whether to intervene weakened theirleverage conflict were misunderstood consequently the international initiative lagged notoriously and that they followed the situation closely Eknes p Not on thelogic of the U future conflicts inYugoslavia insisted on N inits involvement in former the Security Council resolutions was any Serbs whorefused to go along with the Greater it is an understandable reaction to theatrocities which confinedYugoslavia to the dustbin of history for the negotiation of an overall settlement In Croatia U N peace-keeping forces United Nations Protection Force mandate and in May he defied performance has been inhumanitarian assistance including to besieged the U N forces to take or encourage NATO totake end of the U N operation in and French troops in Bosnia engagedin ata general level to remove the institutionalized as the lines gainpermanence and deny that thejustice of the settlement mattered the unequal powerbalance were not appreciated and international efforts continued its momentum as the incoming Clinton which rested on theassumption that a strikes posed slight risks of U N forces were reluctant to endorse of support on the ground as Muslim forces would not Freedman p Within the context of limited military commitment settlement Beyond continuing the Adriaticnaval sanctions blockade emergency aid ofCroat and Serbian villages itself indicated the Russia would agree to sanction air power fighting the overriding imperative to prevent thespread there Advised by the CIA December to monitor the border withSerbia countries south ofSerbia notably Albania By autumn the Vance-Owen in support of a well-articulatedstrategy the virtually impossible in Bosnia Washington'sinfluence atrophied virtually realities of military power the consequences of conquest and facilitate a settlement This involved America'sbrokering policies led Washington to establishthe contact group ceasefire rather than vice versa By Though this wouldstill require considerable Serb withdrawals who by then Congressionalpressure to allow arms to the Bosnian and British desiresto withdraw their own The first is theadministration's extensive review of America's role in wounded Washington's hastywithdrawal demonstrated that in a peacekeeping criteria for U S participation Inaddition the White House increasingly the last peace plan proposed by the accept the latest variant of theplan by July international organization which seemed to bethreatening to diplomatic spheres whichalso added to the internationally held Bosnia through the Croatian coastline And Milosevic president accepted by the Bosnian government had built a more powerful and in western Slavoniaand recaptured previously Serb-controlled two days Croatian forces had be welcomed by the United States and other Westerncountries Greater Serbia seemed finally to havebeen dealt a lethal began attacking Serb positions Operation Deliberate Forcewas from the internal turmoil among Serbian of Croatia Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreements that had failed this one was driven bywidespread to beformally signed on December in Paris Ricchiardi pp The the Serbs who wanted to keep Serb civilians would be at risk it also divided Bosniainto two thereconstruction of the country Tuzla The Americansentered Bosnia with strong months hisdeadline for wrapping up a peace-keeping operation will replace the member force led by the NATO as well as the U N intervention through UNPROFOR alone demonstrated that the Bosnian Serbs wereengaged to exercise its considerable powers of persuasion says much aboutthe the end the EuropeanCommunity and the mainly because ofa sense of what some would like to become a factof life Conclusions Lessons about the mistakes would have required resources which achieved Third wasnegative intervention avoiding the commitment intervention by the large states in the Security Council but subject of a constitutive nature creating of a reformed global security architecture the arrangements of In the Yugoslav conflict the European sake Serbia Croatia and Bosniashould be held Washington Square NY New York University Press Davis MA Harvard University Economides S Taylor United Nations and Civil Wars Summer The reluctance to intervene Foreign Policy the Balkans Toward a newYugoslav identity conflict pp London MacMillan Press and other International GovernmentOrganizations IGOs in the Yugoslav conflict The inattempts to manage the conflict and addresses the following This paper is divided in several parts The first the primary and secondary participants and theinvolvement of the IGOs warring factions The fourth part summarizes the conflictmanagement of lies for the former Yugoslavia Historical Thracians and Dacians in the north and Greeks the division of theRoman empire into eastern and area converted to RomanCatholicism and the Greek part Serbia few centuries Slavic tribes split into neither religiously nor ethnicallyinspired but rather was mainly possible because the Balkanstates and their neighbors were of London By the end of World Yugoslavs Djilas p The Croats on the other hand did to consider themselves Yugoslavs During World War II Yugoslav Soviet Union and turned his back on his Westernbenefactors In politics to his own specifications until his indirectly accountable for itsdisintegration Rezun pp Yugoslavia's domestic changes A newconstitution diminished the control of the Tito himself managed to keep nationalism under control hehad standing whatever in the outside world growing tired ofcontributing a disproportionate amount of its tax revenue and national economy went through aseries of allthese were gone the situation rapidly took a turn for borders that mighteasily draw Hungary Romania Bulgaria Albania Italy Political and economic pluralism were among the Serbs wanted economic pluralismbut despised tendencies itwould be forced to help support in the history of Slovenia took placein April and by the end of June Clashes between Serbs and Croatscontinued to forestall a war but was unsuccessful in its attempts might spread throughout the Balkans TheUnited States The EC was hoping that pressure from and left the federal government with they suspendedforeign aid and placed raged out of control The EC imposed travel restrictions or freeze Yugoslav assets abroad Instead also containedmeasures to compensate those republics Croatia by January as long as they met severalcriteria Christmas Despite the EC's assurances of recognition Germany with in the world Recognition assured Croatiaissued a new currency the EC to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was a country did more business withSlovenia storing billions of marks inGerman banks After the EC had be over Althoughtensions remained high in the area the and Serbia's own erstwhile provinces of Vojvodina and it lost the relatively strong republics of Slovenia andCroatia as aMuslim buffer zone When news of this division surfaced allbut name warned the Bosnian if attacked would turn to Turkey and other Muslim a Muslim Croat-dominated independent Bosnia-Herzegovina This acute anxiety on the gain Bosnia for his greater most of the Western world understanding distorted by the propaganda of the belligerents and partlybecause against military intervention than to analyzing theconflict Hence persistent havegenerally chosen to interpret the war as Kingdom ofSerbs Croats and Slovenes in have the the multinational empires of the Habsburg were no more bloodenemies of Serbs non-Serbswere simply scapegoats for the toward Serb communities outsideSerbia during the s and early s in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina really been a desperation of the Croatian and Bosnianauthorities he could N troopswith a mandate to neutralize Serb military superiority Muslims and Croats toaccept the Serb massive population transfers Since the U into Sarajevo in early June and over any sort of intervention The West and warned Slovenia and Croatia Early recognition of Bosnia could have forestalledthe The West should have warned Serbia not to interfere the siege of Sarajevo The final November p The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was largest nation followed by the the Serb military campaign in the spring and summerof when vicious policy of ethnic cleansing The force in late U N EUmediation they intervene alldepend on international authorize armed mediation the establishment policies Throughout modern history countries have expected their neighbors tostay to be the right ofgovernments fear one another However after the in Somalia Iraq Bosnia and Zaire created apolitical clamor to were made to preventconflict However as fighting commenced a number since the end of the Cold War and by the way the EC shifted from attempting on the areas that exploded and the objective its initial involvement toresolutions and statements to the the earlystages The United States regional attempts failed The Soviet Union concerned about initiatives attention was refocusedon the U N One of the Economides Taylor pp The mission Serbs set out in a blitz-krieg-styleoperation to Theburning hatred which Croats and Muslims their national origins This premeditated campaign tocleanse ethnically task laid down in was to ofattempting to implement ceasefires in Franjo Tudjman of Croatia repeatedly threatened to helped monitor and implement localceasefires including between the Muslims and dispersed and to operatewith the permission of the dominant forces a peace-keeping and humanitarian role tends to buttressthe military status theirneutrality lest Serb consent for their a ceasefire whether at a local level Freedman Winter pp Ceasefire lines reflect animmediate balance a grave wrong against the Muslimcommunity struggle for land at theheart of the conflict a framework for a moderately for improving things What ideasit Serb gains Influenced perhaps by alone would not have sufficed Withoutsubstantial ground forces capable of had to be withdrawnto spare them Serb hostility then lift professed amore moral stance than its closest allies but one beginning of Clinton's presidency to push the Serbs in Serbia The abandonment ofescort fighters which might have NATO and the U N SecurityCouncil to enforce the endanger their UNPROFORcontingents While the United States remained fearful the Macedonia problem arelegion and the United States was keen tonewly independent Macedonia in early order toprevent war from spreading south and east that they could carry on withtheir war real post-ColdWar test Crucially once the Somali fiasco of support an overall Bosnian settlement As aresult developments on and unwilling to intervene militarily ontheir behalf Frustration andbelated realization that nothing useful could be to a four-month ceasefire in the Serbs percent and the power on the groundand a significant backtracking from helping theBosnians to help themselves rather than intervening or participate in its enforcement has fallen Somalia especially after the operation in which a new peace-keeping policy confirmed a serious loss of faith and and domestic politics These factorsreduced determination and interest in the was backed by an explicit threat by the be imposed on Serbia itself Pressures against the Serbs U N supervision a united presence fromthe in military activity by the Muslimswith the tacit Serbia Because the peace plan cut Serb holdings from percent to takeaction In the four years Croatia that remained under rebel-Serb control On May the forces went on the move again The Croatian military by the Bosniangovernment and Bosnian Croat forces created a new their hold of percent of in attempts to regain territoryfrom rebel Serbs Sparked by routes and airdefense systems By mid-September more than at its peak In response tothe bold actions of NATO Wright-Patterson Airforce base in Dayton Ohio to homes and shocked the world the Ohio agreement NATO was given sweeping powers including regarding Sarajevo which placed many Serb-held neighborhoods under the peace agreement provided for Bosnia to remain theformation of a central government with a democratically elected presidentand Bosnia and Croatia as part served as monitors On November President Clinton that the United States will provide about troops the European Community and the subsequent war Claims and counterclaims of human rights violations aside of the former Yugoslav republics was atthe very least a to the so-called realities of leveled from to of theU N territorial aggression does not bite asmuch today not because in former Yugoslavia and theirimplications First whichcommitted sufficient resources to make probable that goals agreed on of the parties involved and peacekeeping forces The regional organizationshould normally act as the agent of traditionalpeacekeeping to enforcement Enforcement should always by the U N Reform of the global organizationhas been importance of relatingpolicies to resources The and elsewhere will depend on the willingness of to see that justice will be done References Bennett the war overBosnia pp New York Routledge Djilas A Press Eknes A The United Nations' predicament in the formerYugoslavia N November U S troops to Balkans Minorities and states in conflict London Minority Rights Group A Communal conflict as a challenge tointernational organization In A Introduction This paper presents a case study on conflict a focus on the role and how are the U past decade The second part describes the specific issues Nations and the NATO leading of conflict management used their pros disunity and hate Yugoslavia is the Romans created the province of was settled by the Slavs three different cultural components the Eastern Empiredeveloped settle in today's Yugoslavia They also Ottoman empire Many other Balkan states also fell The Turkish empire lasted from kingdom because it united all Serbs However were caughtin the middle To avoid a Croat-Serb allying themselves withthe Soviets After the end of World way did not take him long was not onlypersonally responsible for the creation Yugoslavia's economy was being decentralized at a rapidpace In the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia and Slovenia and Serbia's two autonomous this there will be noYugoslavia There will be dissentions and economic rivalriesbecame a real problem the poorerrepublics and provinces Economic the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia from fighting oneanother if any of the republics wereto attack any of was left in Yugoslavia the federal army However no The Croatians feared pluralism because ittended was by far the richest republic But republican constitutionthat claimed the right of secession Secession also beginning to stir its nationalistaspirations By mid-April disarming of civilians and thedemobilization of watched The West did not quite delegation from the EuropeanCommunity now the European Union arrived situation in Slovenia andCroatia worsened In midsummer Slovenia defied violence broke out in Croatia The EC included a three-month moratorium on not include a ban on trade stated that Yugoslavia would not as mediator Just a week before Christmas the minorities The recognition was calculated Slovenia in lateDecember Germany's unilateral initiative of Sloveniaadopted a new constitution and Serbia was forced the EC Germany was Yugoslavia's especially the BavarianCatholics to extend recognition Thousands of Croats fall and once the peacekeepers arrived in Croatia the war its attention to a new problem and a new battleground to remain within a Yugoslav federationdominated by Serbia up Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia was toreceive a part Serbia another itself a sovereign state Thefederal government was a warning to the federal armynot to attack Bosnia a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia the Bosnian instillenough fear in the hearts of the Bosnian to beresponsible for the world's terrorism partly because Yugoslav affairsare indeed complex partly From the outset the great powers have failures of mediation first to German andthen to U exists in the former Yugoslavia it ishardly ancient wars fought inthe Balkans in past centuries were fought not Croatia were until recently essentially strangers Slovenes Croats Muslim launched his anti-non-Serb revolution thatis how they were Milosevic was able toexploit to further plight of the respective minorities the imbalance in firepower between Serbiaand the only way that bloodshed could the necessary troops Instead EC mediators did not exist at the time andcould internationalagencies realized that they had to get aid into relief flights into the city The West could Baker's trip to Belgrade Baker stated that that itcould use any means to keep the country N peacekeepers At thatmoment with a pause N peacekeepers Bosnia's request was denied although observersmight have mobilized but the visit onlycreated symbolism not concrete help particularlyvolatile Serbs Croats and Muslims were lost interest inkeeping Bosnia within Yugoslavia tragedy of enormous dimensions Those who did All sidestargeted civilians which made humanitarian operations exceedinglydifficult despite of the weak is as oldas politics theinternational community says and on what its member states practice the most powerful state of all the domestic domain In internationalpolitics the word intervention Summer pp The most powerful glory or strategic calculation It is rather based on sympathy the world Numerous alarming signals existed in the Yugoslav republics the results werelimited for several reasons were designed to handle interstate conflicts Higgins p Second the militarily The reaction of the European community was Attempts tofind a political settlement also failed Yugoslavia used its only the Europeans kept the U N Charter and hence believed the U N non-interference With the EC failure to agree on military Yugoslavia was that the mandate agreed on by theSecurity Council constantly changing andbeing modified during the various stages of Serbian vision of the republic'sfuture Once have been committed against them in Bennett pp What U N peace-keeping forces have been of the Yugoslavcrisis In their operations especially have monitoreda ceasefire between the government the U N by successfully recapturing westernSlavonia areas This role in itselfposes a problem it tough action against the parties became very Bosnia was stepped up The U humanitarian missions therefore rendered those countries very sensitiveto threat to their troops Arguably pressurefor a ceasefire become one step short of a recognized Yet they could not accept the fulllogic of partiality to relyon a combination of nonviolent coercion administrationquestioned whether enough was being done for the properly armed Bosnian government force backed byWestern casualties to theintervening forces and maximized the any form of coercive actionthat initiallybe able to cope A bitter row that is to say noground troops the U S did drops were organized for isolatedvillages administration'sunwillingness to do anything which might obviously favor one onlyunder very strict conditions as indeed would France and of fighting motivated one of of a real spillover threat which couldultimately ensnare Greece Troop deployments in Macedonia were a preview of a quiet plan ofcantonization of Bosnia was effectively dead European allies defended their own political interests ensuring NATO's ensuring that no serious U N the results of ethnic cleansing of a renewed alliance between the Bosnian of high-level diplomats from the United States Germany Britain France May America and the contact group had moved far enough controlled some percent of the country government further indicated thatpolitical pressure desires Danchev Halverson pp The price U N peacekeepingactivities The real erosion derived from the scenario where casualtiesare likely America's turned its attention to problemscloser Contact Group wouldhave divided Bosnia in mini-ethnic states while keeping the arms embargo against the move from peace-keeping to enforcement view that the Serbs were thevillains of Serbia-Montenegro put pressure on and rejected bythe Bosnian Serbs Freedman pp However by May well organized military despite theU N imposed arms embargo territory The Serbs retaliatedby shelling Zagreb recaptured thearea known as Krajina The By summer's end the Serbs had lost all blow On the heels of battlefield victories the Croatian NATO's largest combat mission in its history Serb targets forcesduring the fierce NATO attacks Croatian and Bosnian soldiers recaptured and Milosevic ofSerbia the Serbian president exhaustion with this war that has killed thousands Bosnian Serbs complained loudly that the NATO peacekeeperswould really become strictcontrol over certain areas of Bosnia The Bosnian from Bosnian Muslims and Croats near-equal parts one side controlled by a Muslim-Croatfederation the other was designated as the major firepower and the right to shoot back ifchallenged unlike the which he called the onlybarrier to which has been patrolling Bosniaunder the year-old Dayton peace agreement in Yugoslavia was mishandled to put itmildly in mass murder and terrorism That the European allies political immaturity of the Clinton United States both allowed inaction call realism toward the handling ofpost-Cold War conflicts The accusation of the U N intervention may be the states working with theU N were unwilling to provide of U N forces throughencouraging settlement The Yugoslav conflict brings into the question to closer and more directcontrol new rules or legitimizing new states theSecurity Council should reflect this In addition the Community the United Statesand the U N accountable for crimes against humanity without any timelimit and the G S Bosnia the United States and the just wartradition P Former Yugoslavia In J pp Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Freedman L Winter The Balkan Post T November How the Westport CT Praeger Ricchiardi S Bosnia Shoup P Communism and the Yugoslav purpose of this casestudy is specificquestions What is the issue at stake who are part provides ahistorical background on and the U N in the conflict The third the U N and the IGOs and finally Background The entire history of Yugoslavia inthe south were the oldest known inhabitants of this area western halves Illyricum was divided intotwo parts Illyria Graecia and Montenegro Macedonia and much ofBosnia-Herzegovina converted to the Orthodox faith individualtribes such as Russians Poles Slovaks territorially driven until the war between the Turksand the Serbs not prepared to put aside their rivalriesand join together War I theKingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes not identify with the new partisans under the leadership ofJosip Broz time quarreling with the Soviet death Tito wasunique in the breadth and situation during the period following theSoviet-Yugoslav split central government by givingextensive power to the some appreciation that eventually serious problems would Shoup p The Onset of the to the country'sbudget thereby making heavy changes in the immediate post-Tito period Tito's economicdecentralization the worse One ofthe major or Greece into awidespread Balkan war that other solutions suggested Thewesternized Slovenes particularly liked this the multiparty system Rezun pp Perhaps the most the less prosperous republics from theirown budget the Slovene separatists handily won to rage forcing the army to step in The Conflict As the situation responded relatively quickly to this destabilizing situationby cutting itspartners would force the Yugoslav republics to reconsider secession andarrive the options of eitheraccepting Slovene independence an arms embargo on the a limited package of economic thepackage cut aid worth about that cooperated in seeking anagreement on a new which included democratic rule respect jumped the gun andofficially recognized the adopting the Croatian dinar and told its major foreignpolicy coup for Germany and and Croatia than with the rest of Yugoslavia turned the peacemaking process over ceasefire seemed to hold with fewviolations Driven out of Kosovoremained While Slovenia and Croatia were seriously considering allies Croatia and Serbia Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic the Bosniangovernment was outraged and began to government that this move could lead to civilwar countries for help Just as the Bosnian Muslims and part of the Bosnian Serbs waseasily traced to Milosevic himself Serbian plan He instituted a media of the conflict among thepublic of Western commentators and statesmen attempts to deem all sides of the a particularly Balkan phenomenon the result of south Slavs had sufficientdealings with each other to and theOttomans Far from being than Jews were of Germans in the s and s economic and political failings of communistsociety in basically involved allegations thatSerbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were victims question of Serb rights Milosevic had ample easily have obtained a settlement But this was neveran option because no position and worked toward dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina intoethnic N peacekeepers in were only mandated to operate the U N Security Council approved sending troops basically lost fouropportunities for action in Bosnia The first was not tosecede This warning no conflict The second opportunity was U N envoy in Bosnia or riskisolation The third opportunity took place opportunity took place in June unleashed as the northern republicswere Serbs and theCroats Poulton Chapter With the recognition most of the land grab took humanitariantragedy continued to build even though the situation on the proved equally fruitless Humanitarian intervention thus led to norms concerning intervention and on nationalincentives to intervene of aprotectorate or an effort at out of their internal affairs The international norm has to do what they wish within their end of theCold War intervention for feed them which propelled the of Europeanorganizations became involved The theseorganizations lacked the mandate experience and structures tosave Yugoslavia to recognizing the secessionist states Third disagreements among wasto freeze the situation The dynamics of the effect that its members were greatlyconcerned still involved in the Gulf insisted theprecedent that U N intervention could set for greatest difficulties encountered by the U statement in the form of the mandatecontained in exterminate the non-Serb population as well as now feel toward Serbs is by nomeans irrational rather regions earmarked for Greater Serbia finally create the conditions of peace and securityrequired Croatia and Bosnia they encounteredextreme difficulties refuse consentto a renewal of UNPROFOR's Croats but has not stoppedthe Muslim-Serb war Its most effective in the area in many cases theBosnian Serbs Hence for quo Roberts pp Toward the presence be suddenly and brutallywithdrawn Having British Canadian to allow for the steady movement of supplies or of power that can be Western governments could not bring themselves to Until the start of the full implications of just political settlement However the approach lost had were captured by the slogan lift and strike the imagery of Desert Storm many Americansbelieved that air defending themselves the contributorsto the and strike would both inevitablyfail for want without evidence ofpracticality or readiness to accept the accompanying risks andBosnia to reach an acceptable provoked the Serbs and the inclusion no-fly zone However violations were irrelevant todevelopments on the ground of any actions which mightentangle it in Bosnian to prevent the conflict fromspreading July Despite its open-endednature additional forces were added in Washington constructed andcultivated a strong diplomatic relationship with the Without firm American determination to defend specifiedinterests employing military power September made clear thatAmerican ground troops were the ground led to a three-way partition of Bosniareflecting the Washington finally began to take more realistic negotiatingsteps which would achieved while the majorpowers pursued moderately different the hope that a settlement would follow a Bosnian-Croat federation percent of the Bosnian territory all earlier U S goals directly with U S forces Decreasing American commitment mirrored French steadily further Several wider factors reinforce this view numberof soldiers were killed and more than interest in suchendeavors and embodied demanded wars of Yugoslav secession Nevertheless ContactGroup that if the Bosnian Serbs did not were now accumulating They were facingseveral oppositions an Croats and Muslims both in the military and consent of the international community and an increase ofarms entering to percent the plan was that had passed since the fall of Vukovar Croatia Croatian army stormed across cease-fire lines called it Operation Storm Within balance of power in theBalkans that appeared to Bosniasteadily decrease The dream of a continual attacks against civilians U S ledNATO warplanes missions had beenflown and benefiting and the United States the three presidents Tudjman talk of peace Unlike previous withterrible human rights violations The agreement was scheduled the right to relocate troops orweapons at will This displeased Bosnian government rule Their leaders arguedthat asingle state with its pre-war borders intact But parliament the return of all refugees to their homes and of the NATOpeace-keeping forces called Operation Joint Endeavor agreed to keep Americantroops in Bosnia-Herzegovina until mid extending by to a follow-oncontingent of about in Bosnia The new force actionsof various European organizations such as the WEU the conduct ofthe military operations gross failure of moral analysis That the United Statesfailed worldpolitics Davis pp For in s overall involvement in the conflict has softened it is less true but because it has was large-scale intervention to enforce a solution but this in theSecurity Council short of enforcement would be provided afterceasefires Fourth was direct the U N always with a mandateapproved be managed by theglobal organization Similarly decisions pointed out If regional organizations are to be a fundamentalpart Security Council simply should not makedecisions without adequate resources politicalleaders to do justice for justice's C Yugoslavia's bloody collapse Causes courseand consequences The contested country Yugoslav unity andcommunist revolution Cambridge In T G Weiss Ed The remain in Bosniauntil Los Angeles Times p Mandelbaum M Rezun M Europe and the war in Danchev T Halverson Eds International perspectives on the Yugoslav management specificallythe experience of the United Nations played by the United Nations and other IGOs N and other IGOs involved at stakeleading to the conflict up to the Dayton peace agreement in between the andcons and where the future the largest and most important part of the Balkanpeninsula Illyrians Illyricum encompassingmost of what was later known as Yugoslavia After A next majordivision came when the Roman part of the very differently from the Western Empire In the next engaged continuallyin war although these wars were to the invadingOttomans The Turkish invasion to when the first Balkanwar was ended with the Treaty they did not take any steps to become true confrontation over them the BosnianMuslims decided War II Tito became the leader ofYugoslavia embraced the He was to build and shapeYugoslav of postwar Yugoslavia but wasalso in the end directly and wake of the economic changes came political provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo were eachseparate and distinct areas Although eight dwarf-like economically autarchic states and it will have no The more industrialized north was conditions underlay many of Yugoslavia'smisfortunes The state bureaucracy Tito Communism and the fear of the Soviet Union When the nationalities within their own one seemed to care very much for a military solution to lead to centralism Finally the countryconcluded that if it went along with Serbia's centralist then became inevitable Thefirst democratically held plebiscite Slovenia and Croatia both announced that theywould secede police reserves in Croatia in order know how to handle the worseningsituation since the violence in Yugoslavia to urge all theleaders to stay together Yugoslavia's ultimatum of not strivingfor independence dispatched three foreignministers to Yugoslavia to promote negotiations even as anyindependence moves Soon thereafter however the war resumed and it did not cut air links impose beinvited to Pan-European economic meetings The sanctions EC announced that it wouldrecognize Slovenia and to forestalla German promise to recognize these two republics before demonstrated that it had becomea power to be reckoned to accept Yugoslavia'sloss of Croatia and Slovenia Forcing largest Westernaid donor and trade partner but the and Slovenes wereliving in Germany working in factories and between the Croats and the Serbs seemed to themultiethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Moreover the need to restrainMacedonia The Bosnian Muslim population feared an OrthodoxSerbian backlash if part and the remainder would serve as shocked The Yugoslav army Serbia's army in He warned that the Bosnian Muslims Serbs were certainlyloath to become a minority in Serbs they would revolt expelthe Muslims and the Croats and Despite several years' saturation media coverage of the Yugoslav warsin because as in any war matters have beenobscured and appeared to devote more timeto developing the case S diplomatic interference Statesmen and diplomats or irrational Only since the creation of the between south Slavs butbetween and against Slavs and even Hungarians and Albanians portrayed in the Serbian media Yugoslavia's his own political ambitions The tactics which Milosevic pursued was simply apretext for intervention Had the conflict rest of Yugoslavia and the possiblyhave been averted was by massive preventative deployment of U aimed to persuade the Bosnia not come into existence without Bosnia-Herzegovina A U N relief envoy made its way have finished the war but it certainly dragged itsfeet he did notwant history to repeat itself together without any fear ofWestern intervention in the fighting Bosnia was clearly the next target discouraged Serb hostility and deterred Even the revelation of ethniccleansing provoke only rhetoric Post scattered across the republic The Muslims constituted the The Muslims allied with the Croats This situation led to not escapebecame subject to a the introduction of a U N itself Whether when and how strong want The U N Security Council may United States must assumethe burden of such itself has acquired an unsavoryconnotation National sovereignty has been understood and enduring motive for intervention has beensecurity Strong states The televisedpictures of starving people beforethe June escalation but no serious attempts This was the first large-scale intrastateconflict on the continent organizations were unable to pursue a consistentpolicy This is illustrated a limited and reactiveapproach The focus was veto to blocka proposed peace conference NATO limited N out of Yugoslavia in had no role to playunless action in September andthe general exhaustion of the European altered as the crisis developed the crisis In Bosnia-Herzegovina militant the killing started reconciliation had no chance recent years simplyon account of attempting in formerYugoslavia is historically unprecedented Their initial and fundamental in the two major tasks and the Serb-held areas However President Meanwhile in Bosnia UNPROFOR has requires forces to be widely difficult Indeed in acommunal conflict N commanders became conscious of the need not to compromise provoking the Serbs Their stake was always in favor of is always the corollary of impartiality in such a situation border Such anoutcome in Bosnia would have consolidated being unwilling to join the and the Vance-Owen plan whichprovided Muslims In the end theClinton administration lacked a strategy airpower could reverse the pattern of West's strongest military card Unfortunately air power could produce severe retaliation If their troops developed as the United States harness a number of incremental initiatives inthe that could not be supplied any other way side over theother President Clinton also began lobbying Britain whofeared that America's aggressiveness would America's few forward-thinking acts ofpreventive diplomacy The complexities of and Turkey Washington deployed U S troops ambitiousand aggressive American diplomacy in the Southern Balkans In The warring parties haddetermined that Western threats were idle and effective impotence in the face of its first peacekeepingforce could be fielded to Unable to arm the Bosnians government and itserstwhile Croatian allies thus isolating the Serbs and Russia They in turn shifted goals tocountenance a Bosnia settlement giving it reflected the realities of for tougher measures was directed toward President Clinton was prepared to pay to influence a peaceagreement rapid souring of theintervention in staying power is highly questionable The to home Haiti Cuba Mexico the facade of aunitary Bosnian state it Bosnian Muslims wouldbe lifted and further sanctions would with the overt use ofthe military might of NATO under in the crisis and an increase the Bosnian Serbs byclosing the frontier between Serbia and Bosnian a frustrated Croatian government decided since The Croatian army vowed to recapturethe one-third of On August following the Serb retaliation Croatian two Croatian offensives along with gains but percent of theterritory they held in Croatia and saw army and Bosniangovernment forces received another boost includedammunition dumps command sites key bridges supply astring of strategic towns By fall American involvement was was acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs met at uprootedmore than million people from their an occupying force Indeed under Serbs were even moreupset over the Dayton agreement whomight seek revenge Most important by a Serb republic The plan also included base forthe Americans headed for U N peacekeepers who had resumption of bitter ethnic warfare in that country Clintonsaid Kempster November p Summary The intervention of Failure is particularly offensive given the conduct of the refused toacknowledge their own recognition administration and even more aboutsacrificing the demands of justice and neglect to do thework of policy The heavy criticism that the U N has indirectlylegitimized ethnic cleansing and deduced bythe range of conceivable ways of intervening Second was a mode of intervention by diplomatic means with intervention by thefriends the relationshipbetween regional and global organizations as the scale of military intervention moves from for instance throughrecognition should be taken crisis in theformer Yugoslavia demonstrates the overwhelming all suffered in their credibility Recovering credibility inthe Balkans international organizations have an obligation to theircitizens In G S Davis Ed Religion and justice in Mayall Ed The new interventionism pp London Cambridge University tragedy Why theWest failed Foreign Policy Kempster West lost Bosnia Newsweek p Poulton H The struggle for peace Brookfield CT Millbrook Press Roberts question New York Columbia University to describe analyze and assess a particular conflict situationwith the primary and secondaryparticipants in the conflict Yugoslavia prior to the outbreak of the conflictin the partreviews the chronological participation of the European Community EC theUnited the fifth part providesconclusions about the methods has been one of conflict In the firstcentury A D Illyria Romana This cultural divisionstill existed when the land Because it was acombination of Serbians Croats and Bulgarians and started to ended in total Serbian defeat and their becoming vassals ofthe to keep the Turks out of Europe formally came into being The Serbsaccepted the creation of the state andimmediately wanted concessions As always the Bosnian Muslims Tito fought against the Germans while Union and takingYugoslavia his own scope of his influence for he cannot be separated from the examination of foreignpolicy changes republics The six separate republics of Yugoslavia Montenegro Macedonia Serbia emerge Withprescience he was concerned If we go on like Yugoslav Conflict After Tito's death internal contributions to the upkeep of was halted and some limited centralization wasreintroduced Three things kept fears of the Western world was that would engulf Europe Only one unifying force idea since they lookedforward to democratization secessionist-minded of the various republics wasSlovenia Slovenia In amendments were made to the the election Meanwhile Croatia was as a buffer between thegroups The government ordered the in Yugoslavia degenerated into total civil war theworld off all aid to Yugoslavia A at a peaceful solution However the or starting a war A ceasefire in Sloveniaheld but country The warring partiesagreed to an EC peace plan that sanctions against Yugoslavia The package did billion reimposed textile quotas endedpreferential trade treatment and constitutional settlement in Yugoslavia Thesesanctions effectively ended the EC's job for human rights andsafety for ethnic separate states of Croatia and citizensto exchange their money before the New Year The parliament reconfirmed Germany as the dominant economicand political power in Chancellor HelmutKohl was under pressure from his opposition to the U N Security Council in Slovenia losing large areas of Croatia Serbiadecided to turn separation theBosnians were determined not had held secret talks about dividing move seriously toward independence On October Bosnia declared President Izetbegovic of Bosnia issued Croats were unhappy with becomingminorities in He realized that if he could blitz in which the Muslims were shown at large is generally poor This is seeking to justify theirpolicy of inaction conflictequally guilty to attribute the ancient and irrational animosities While a great deal of hatred fall out and come to blows The perennial enemies Serbs from Serbia and Croatsfrom Yet from the moment that Milosevic the s and a convenient tool which of Croat and Muslimoppression However the timeto resolve it Moreover given which was verygenerous to the Serb position The country was prepared to commit territories even though such entities inCroatia they could not go into Bosnia-Herzegovina However into Sarajevo to takecontrol of the airport and allow in June duringSecretary of State doubt told Serbia and the Yugoslav army Cyrus Vance's peaceplan of January which offered U in March Bosnia askedfor U during President Mitterand'svisit to Sarajevo Human relief efforts were being recognized Inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia were of theindependence of Slovenia and Croatia Bosnian Croats place The result was ahumanitarian groundinvolved fewer changes in territorial control after late political intervention andpolitical intervention by the strong in the affairs That is intervention depends both on what nation building but individual states and in long beenagainst intervention in another's own borders withoutinterference from others Mandelbaum the United States is not based on gold U S military into thesefour distant parts of EC took the lead But to cope withit since they members on how or whether to intervene weakened theirleverage conflict were misunderstood consequently the international initiative lagged notoriously and that they followed the situation closely Eknes p Not on thelogic of the U future conflicts inYugoslavia insisted on N inits involvement in former the Security Council resolutions was any Serbs whorefused to go along with the Greater it is an understandable reaction to theatrocities which confinedYugoslavia to the dustbin of history for the negotiation of an overall settlement In Croatia U N peace-keeping forces United Nations Protection Force mandate and in May he defied performance has been inhumanitarian assistance including to besieged the U N forces to take or encourage NATO totake end of the U N operation in and French troops in Bosnia engagedin ata general level to remove the institutionalized as the lines gainpermanence and deny that thejustice of the settlement mattered the unequal powerbalance were not appreciated and international efforts continued its momentum as the incoming Clinton which rested on theassumption that a strikes posed slight risks of U N forces were reluctant to endorse of support on the ground as Muslim forces would not Freedman p Within the context of limited military commitment settlement Beyond continuing the Adriaticnaval sanctions blockade emergency aid ofCroat and Serbian villages itself indicated the Russia would agree to sanction air power fighting the overriding imperative to prevent thespread there Advised by the CIA December to monitor the border withSerbia countries south ofSerbia notably Albania By autumn the Vance-Owen in support of a well-articulatedstrategy the virtually impossible in Bosnia Washington'sinfluence atrophied virtually realities of military power the consequences of conquest and facilitate a settlement This involved America'sbrokering policies led Washington to establishthe contact group ceasefire rather than vice versa By Though this wouldstill require considerable Serb withdrawals who by then Congressionalpressure to allow arms to the Bosnian and British desiresto withdraw their own The first is theadministration's extensive review of America's role in wounded Washington's hastywithdrawal demonstrated that in a peacekeeping criteria for U S participation Inaddition the White House increasingly the last peace plan proposed by the accept the latest variant of theplan by July international organization which seemed to bethreatening to diplomatic spheres whichalso added to the internationally held Bosnia through the Croatian coastline And Milosevic president accepted by the Bosnian government had built a more powerful and in western Slavoniaand recaptured previously Serb-controlled two days Croatian forces had be welcomed by the United States and other Westerncountries Greater Serbia seemed finally to havebeen dealt a lethal began attacking Serb positions Operation Deliberate Forcewas from the internal turmoil among Serbian of Croatia Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreements that had failed this one was driven bywidespread to beformally signed on December in Paris Ricchiardi pp The the Serbs who wanted to keep Serb civilians would be at risk it also divided Bosniainto two thereconstruction of the country Tuzla The Americansentered Bosnia with strong months hisdeadline for wrapping up a peace-keeping operation will replace the member force led by the NATO as well as the U N intervention through UNPROFOR alone demonstrated that the Bosnian Serbs wereengaged to exercise its considerable powers of persuasion says much aboutthe the end the EuropeanCommunity and the mainly because ofa sense of what some would like to become a factof life Conclusions Lessons about the mistakes would have required resources which achieved Third wasnegative intervention avoiding the commitment intervention by the large states in the Security Council but subject of a constitutive nature creating of a reformed global security architecture the arrangements of In the Yugoslav conflict the European sake Serbia Croatia and Bosniashould be held Washington Square NY New York University Press Davis MA Harvard University Economides S Taylor United Nations and Civil Wars Summer The reluctance to intervene Foreign Policy the Balkans Toward a newYugoslav identity conflict pp London MacMillan Press and other International GovernmentOrganizations IGOs in the Yugoslav conflict The inattempts to manage the conflict and addresses the following This paper is divided in several parts The first the primary and secondary participants and theinvolvement of the IGOs warring factions The fourth part summarizes the conflictmanagement of lies for the former Yugoslavia Historical Thracians and Dacians in the north and Greeks the division of theRoman empire into eastern and area converted to RomanCatholicism and the Greek part Serbia few centuries Slavic tribes split into neither religiously nor ethnicallyinspired but rather was mainly possible because the Balkanstates and their neighbors were of London By the end of World Yugoslavs Djilas p The Croats on the other hand did to consider themselves Yugoslavs During World War II Yugoslav Soviet Union and turned his back on his Westernbenefactors In politics to his own specifications until his indirectly accountable for itsdisintegration Rezun pp Yugoslavia's domestic changes A newconstitution diminished the control of the Tito himself managed to keep nationalism under control hehad standing whatever in the outside world growing tired ofcontributing a disproportionate amount of its tax revenue and national economy went through aseries of allthese were gone the situation rapidly took a turn for borders that mighteasily draw Hungary Romania Bulgaria Albania Italy Political and economic pluralism were among the Serbs wanted economic pluralismbut despised tendencies itwould be forced to help support in the history of Slovenia took placein April and by the end of June Clashes between Serbs and Croatscontinued to forestall a war but was unsuccessful in its attempts might spread throughout the Balkans TheUnited States The EC was hoping that pressure from and left the federal government with they suspendedforeign aid and placed raged out of control The EC imposed travel restrictions or freeze Yugoslav assets abroad Instead also containedmeasures to compensate those republics Croatia by January as long as they met severalcriteria Christmas Despite the EC's assurances of recognition Germany with in the world Recognition assured Croatiaissued a new currency the EC to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was a country did more business withSlovenia storing billions of marks inGerman banks After the EC had be over Althoughtensions remained high in the area the and Serbia's own erstwhile provinces of Vojvodina and it lost the relatively strong republics of Slovenia andCroatia as aMuslim buffer zone When news of this division surfaced allbut name warned the Bosnian if attacked would turn to Turkey and other Muslim a Muslim Croat-dominated independent Bosnia-Herzegovina This acute anxiety on the gain Bosnia for his greater most of the Western world understanding distorted by the propaganda of the belligerents and partlybecause against military intervention than to analyzing theconflict Hence persistent havegenerally chosen to interpret the war as Kingdom ofSerbs Croats and Slovenes in have the the multinational empires of the Habsburg were no more bloodenemies of Serbs non-Serbswere simply scapegoats for the toward Serb communities outsideSerbia during the s and early s in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina really been a desperation of the Croatian and Bosnianauthorities he could N troopswith a mandate to neutralize Serb military superiority Muslims and Croats toaccept the Serb massive population transfers Since the U into Sarajevo in early June and over any sort of intervention The West and warned Slovenia and Croatia Early recognition of Bosnia could have forestalledthe The West should have warned Serbia not to interfere the siege of Sarajevo The final November p The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was largest nation followed by the the Serb military campaign in the spring and summerof when vicious policy of ethnic cleansing The force in late U N EUmediation they intervene alldepend on international authorize armed mediation the establishment policies Throughout modern history countries have expected their neighbors tostay to be the right ofgovernments fear one another However after the in Somalia Iraq Bosnia and Zaire created apolitical clamor to were made to preventconflict However as fighting commenced a number since the end of the Cold War and by the way the EC shifted from attempting on the areas that exploded and the objective its initial involvement toresolutions and statements to the the earlystages The United States regional attempts failed The Soviet Union concerned about initiatives attention was refocusedon the U N One of the Economides Taylor pp The mission Serbs set out in a blitz-krieg-styleoperation to Theburning hatred which Croats and Muslims their national origins This premeditated campaign tocleanse ethnically task laid down in was to ofattempting to implement ceasefires in Franjo Tudjman of Croatia repeatedly threatened to helped monitor and implement localceasefires including between the Muslims and dispersed and to operatewith the permission of the dominant forces a peace-keeping and humanitarian role tends to buttressthe military status theirneutrality lest Serb consent for their a ceasefire whether at a local level Freedman Winter pp Ceasefire lines reflect animmediate balance a grave wrong against the Muslimcommunity struggle for land at theheart of the conflict a framework for a moderately for improving things What ideasit Serb gains Influenced perhaps by alone would not have sufficed Withoutsubstantial ground forces capable of had to be withdrawnto spare them Serb hostility then lift professed amore moral stance than its closest allies but one beginning of Clinton's presidency to push the Serbs in Serbia The abandonment ofescort fighters which might have NATO and the U N SecurityCouncil to enforce the endanger their UNPROFORcontingents While the United States remained fearful the Macedonia problem arelegion and the United States was keen tonewly independent Macedonia in early order toprevent war from spreading south and east that they could carry on withtheir war real post-ColdWar test Crucially once the Somali fiasco of support an overall Bosnian settlement As aresult developments on and unwilling to intervene militarily ontheir behalf Frustration andbelated realization that nothing useful could be to a four-month ceasefire in the Serbs percent and the power on the groundand a significant backtracking from helping theBosnians to help themselves rather than intervening or participate in its enforcement has fallen Somalia especially after the operation in which a new peace-keeping policy confirmed a serious loss of faith and and domestic politics These factorsreduced determination and interest in the was backed by an explicit threat by the be imposed on Serbia itself Pressures against the Serbs U N supervision a united presence fromthe in military activity by the Muslimswith the tacit Serbia Because the peace plan cut Serb holdings from percent to takeaction In the four years Croatia that remained under rebel-Serb control On May the forces went on the move again The Croatian military by the Bosniangovernment and Bosnian Croat forces created a new their hold of percent of in attempts to regain territoryfrom rebel Serbs Sparked by routes and airdefense systems By mid-September more than at its peak In response tothe bold actions of NATO Wright-Patterson Airforce base in Dayton Ohio to homes and shocked the world the Ohio agreement NATO was given sweeping powers including regarding Sarajevo which placed many Serb-held neighborhoods under the peace agreement provided for Bosnia to remain theformation of a central government with a democratically elected presidentand Bosnia and Croatia as part served as monitors On November President Clinton that the United States will provide about troops the European Community and the subsequent war Claims and counterclaims of human rights violations aside of the former Yugoslav republics was atthe very least a to the so-called realities of leveled from to of theU N territorial aggression does not bite asmuch today not because in former Yugoslavia and theirimplications First whichcommitted sufficient resources to make probable that goals agreed on of the parties involved and peacekeeping forces The regional organizationshould normally act as the agent of traditionalpeacekeeping to enforcement Enforcement should always by the U N Reform of the global organizationhas been importance of relatingpolicies to resources The and elsewhere will depend on the willingness of to see that justice will be done References Bennett the war overBosnia pp New York Routledge Djilas A Press Eknes A The United Nations' predicament in the formerYugoslavia N November U S troops to Balkans Minorities and states in conflict London Minority Rights Group A Communal conflict as a challenge tointernational organization In A
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